
25X1

SECRET

The Director of Central Intelligence



Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

22 June 1983

NOTE FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

Hans Heymann, Jr.

National Intelligence Officer at Large

The attached informal intelligence assessment points to a sharp reduction in the incidence of CW/Toxin Use noted in the first five months of 1983. It was prepared at State's request as background for Secretary Shultz's ASEAN trip next week. State/PM is recommending to Shultz that he reveal this finding to the ASEAN governments in a low-key way ("we are cautiously hopeful...").

The assessment reflects the collective views of the DCI Working Group on CW/Toxin Use

25X1

Hans Heymann, Jr.

Attachment:

As Stated

cc: C/NIC

VC/NIC (H.Meyer) VC/NIC (C. Waterman)

SECRET



21 June 1983

Indications of Sharply Decreased Use of Chemical-Toxin Weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan

Summary and Conclusions

A review of all available recent intelligence on the use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, reveals a striking reduction in the incidence of such attacks since the beginning of 1983. Reports of chemical attacks—including lethal events—continue to be received, but, for the most part these relate to events of an earlier period, principally mid-to-late 1982. Moreover, the few instances of chemical attacks reportedly occurring in 1983—less than a half dozen—refer to the use of riot control agents and incapacitants rather than lethal agents. In spite of a high level of combat activity in all three theaters—Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan a single lethal chemical attack has been confirmed as having occurred so far this year. Also, in this same period, the classic symptomology of mycotoxicosis is entirely absent.	

While an hiatus of five months is insufficient to permit strong conclusions (seasonal lulls of two or three months have been noted in earlier years and there are often substantial time lags between occurrence of a chemical event and its detection), the fact that the current break is unprecedentedly long and is taking place during a period of relatively intense combat activity suggests the possibility that a Soviet policy decision to suspend the use of lethal chemical/toxin agents may have been taken.


SECRET

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1



25**X**1

25X1

SECRET